An essay on blindness, in a letter to a person of distinction : reciting the most interesting particulars relative to persons born blind, and those who have lost their sight : being an enquiry into the nature of their ideas, knowledge of sounds, opinions concerning morality and religion, &c. interspersed with several anecdotes of Sanderson, Milton, and others : with copper-plates elucidating Dr. Sanderson's method of working geometrical problems / translated from the French of M. Diderot, physician to His most Christian Majesty.

  • Diderot, Denis, 1713-1784.
Date:
[1780?]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: An essay on blindness, in a letter to a person of distinction : reciting the most interesting particulars relative to persons born blind, and those who have lost their sight : being an enquiry into the nature of their ideas, knowledge of sounds, opinions concerning morality and religion, &c. interspersed with several anecdotes of Sanderson, Milton, and others : with copper-plates elucidating Dr. Sanderson's method of working geometrical problems / translated from the French of M. Diderot, physician to His most Christian Majesty. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by University of Bristol Library. The original may be consulted at University of Bristol Library.

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    own is, becaufe we fhall never be liable to take ourfelf for another perfon, or another for ourfelf; then, the helps which our fen- fes reciprocally afford to each other, hinder their improvement. It is not here only that I fliall have occafion to make this re- mark. On this head our blind man faid, “ That <c he fhould think himfelf a pitiable object <c in wanting thole advantages which we “ enjoy; and that he fhould have been “ apt to confider us as fuperior intelli- “ gences, had he not a hundred times “ found us very much inferior to him in <c other refpefts.” This reflection gave rife to another in us. This blind man, faid we, values himfelf as much, and per- haps more, than we who fee. Why then, if the brute reafons, and it is fcarce to be doubted, why, on weighing its advantages over man as better known to it than thofe of man over it, fhould it not make a like inference ? He has arms, perhaps fays the gnat, but I have wings. If he has weapons, fays the lion, have we not claws ?