Individual liberty and the liquor traffic.

Date:
Between 1860 and 1879?]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Individual liberty and the liquor traffic. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    law, Individual Liberty would be sacrificed; and, in the view of some, the maintenance of this liberty is more important than any benefit which increased sobriety would confer. “ Better free than sober ” is a recent expression given to this preference; but the sophistry of the epigram is not hidden by its sparkle. It is incumbent upon those who affirm that Individual Liberty would suffer from the Pro¬ hibition of the liquor traffic to make good their affirmation; but they have found it easier to reiterate the statement in round and thundering phraseology than to show cause in its support. Just liberty is another name for right of action; if no right exists in any particular case no liberty can be claimed, and if no right is attacked no liberty would be lost. Let us imagine the sale of liquor excluded from a district, large or small—what individual right is assailed or made away with 1 Amidst the cloud of words, which often envelopes the discussion of this subject, the only pertinent answer to the inquiry now put is con¬ tained in the assertion, that the liberty of using intoxicating liquors would be destroyed; and when it is pointed out that the Alliance seeks only the interdiction of the sale of strong drink, it is rejoined, that without sale there could be no use, and that as liberty of use would be valueless without sale, prohibition of sale is really as much opposed to liberty cf use as would be a direct prohibition of use. It will be observed, therefore, that the opponents of Prohibition extend their definition of Individual Liberty from liberty of use to liberty of sale, and not only to liberty of sale but to necessity of sale ; for unless the sale is made necessary, how, on their own principle, can the liberty of use be preserved intact 1 To this position, and each section of it, there is a conclusive reply. (1) Mr. Mill himself admits that traffic is to be classed among social acts, and not among those self- regarding acts with which Individual Liberty is concerned. Were it then admitted that drinking is a strictly self-regarding act, and that each person should be free to perform or abstain from it, it would not follow that another act, not self-regarding but social, could be claimed in order to the exercise of the other. If Society has no right to say to the Individual “Thou shalt drink,” or “Thou shalt not drink,” just as little right has the Individual to say to Society, “You must permit drink to be sold.” If the Individual Liberty is a domain not to be invaded by Society, Social Liberty is a domain not to be invaded by the Individual. The Individual is to be free to decide what self-regarding acts are best to be done or left undone ; so Society must be free to decide what social acts are best permitted or prohibited. If the Individual pleads, “ My self-regarding act of drinking cannot be done without a liquor shop,” Society may plead, “ Opening a liquor shop will lead to social con¬ sequences against which we are entitled to defence.” In any case, the distinction must be preserved ; and for the Individual to claim to decide for Society is quite as clear a violation of Liberty, as for a party in a suit to claim to represent both sides, and bring in a verdict for
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