Caution to the public, or, hints upon the nature of scarlet fever, designed to shew, that this disease arises from a peculiar and absolute virus, and is specifically infectious in its mildest as well as in its most malignant form : including some cursory remarks upon plague and other pestilential diseases.

Date:
1831
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Caution to the public, or, hints upon the nature of scarlet fever, designed to shew, that this disease arises from a peculiar and absolute virus, and is specifically infectious in its mildest as well as in its most malignant form : including some cursory remarks upon plague and other pestilential diseases. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The University of Glasgow Library. The original may be consulted at The University of Glasgow Library.

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    Msual tluin to s.cc cxciitt. in the natural world iiuulc biibscrvicnt to moral ends; indeed, so usual, that it may be doubted whetlier every individual event is not intended to produce finally some moral purpose—there may be rflifliculties in cither case, Sec, but our argument is this,—that whilst we see in God's natural government apparent interruptions of general laws, or phenomena, which if assignable to such as we can discover, arc, ihcrefore, classed under the head accidentx (which, like moidrics, mean Just what we can give no account of); we have no need to be staggered at the same, or similar mechanism in the moral government, &c.—Sec Quart, Review, No, 85, Art. 6, on Lhc Wrilings of liishoj) Butkr. Vide Lovkr, p. 322, chap. xxvi. Of cause and cfjecl, and other relations. In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particulars, both qualities and sub- stances, begin to exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observa- tion we get our ideas of cause and effect, &c. Again, having thus, from what our senses are able to discern, in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cause and effect, viz., that a cause is that, which juakes any other thing, and an effect is that, which has its beginning from some otlier thing ; the mind finds no difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts. First, when the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof can exist before, as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exibt, in the nature of things, which had before no being, and this we call creation. Secondly, when a thing is made up of particles which did all of them before exist, but that very thing so constituted of the existing particles, Avhicli, considered altogether, make up such a collection of simple ideas, as had not any existence before; and then, when referred to a substance, proiluced in the ordinary cdursc of things, by internal principle, but set on work and received from some external agent and cause, and woiking by insensible means, which we perceive not, we call generation. Paley's Natural Tiieoi-ogy, p. 187.—Relation of parts to one another accompanies us throughout the whole animal economy. But relation per- haps is never so striking as when it subsists, not between different parts of the same thing, but between different things. The relation between a lock and key, is more obvious, than it is between different parts of the lock, &c. But since the contrivances of nature decidedly evince inten- tion ; and since tli^course of this world, and the contrivances of nature have the same author; we are, by the force of this connexion, led to be- lieve, tlial the appearances, under which events take place, are reconcile- ablc with the supposition of design on the part of the deity. It is enough that they be rcconcilcablc with the supposition; and it io undoiibtcdlv tru<