Somatopsychonoologia : showing that the proofs of body life and mind considered as distinct essences cannot be deduced from physiology but depend on a distinct sort of evidence : being an examination of the controversy concerning life carried on by MM. Laurence, Abernethy, Rennell, & others / by Philostratus.

  • Forster, T. (Thomas), 1789-1860.
Date:
1823
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Somatopsychonoologia : showing that the proofs of body life and mind considered as distinct essences cannot be deduced from physiology but depend on a distinct sort of evidence : being an examination of the controversy concerning life carried on by MM. Laurence, Abernethy, Rennell, & others / by Philostratus. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    prove in the following sheets, and shall show that the doctrine of future life must be rather injured than advanced by such endeavours to support it, as those made by M. Laurence's opponents. In short, while I believe, on the one hand, with MM. Laurence, Gall, Spurzheim, and others*, that every distinct faculty of the mind has its appropriate organ, as much as the senses have; never- theless, I do not m limine mean to iden- tify the Organism either with the Life which moves it, or with the Mind which, by the mysterious inter- vention of the two former, becomes ac- quainted with the external world. But I assert that no opinion, founded on philosophical research, has any thing to do with the question of eternal exist- ence, l^e resurrection of the Body to Life Eternal is one of the Miracles: it is an article of religious faith, aad * See Spurzheim's Physiognomical System, and Forster's Phrenology. London, 1815.